Indian Air Force in absolute catastrophic scenario

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is facing an unprecedented crisis—one that directly threatens its ability to defend the country against growing threats from China and Pakistan. In a revealing interview  defense analyst Shashank Singh—a consultant at Caravan magazine and lecturer at Yale University—laid bare the depth of the challenge. Drawing from his in-depth investigative piece, Singh warned: “The crisis is very, very serious.”

At the core of the problem lies the IAF’s shrinking squadron strength. While the sanctioned requirement stands at 42 squadrons, the Air Force currently operates only 31—a 26% shortfall. Alarmingly, defense expert Ashley Tellis had suggested as early as 2016 that India would require 60 squadrons to handle a simultaneous threat from both China and Pakistan. Rather than improving, the situation has worsened. Two of the current squadrons are still flying MiG-21s—aircraft so outdated, Singh noted, they exist merely to “make up the numbers.” The Jaguar fleet, too, is increasingly obsolete, suffering from a shortage of spare parts and long retired by countries like the UK.

India’s modernization efforts have stalled. Since the 2015 Rafale deal for 36 aircraft, no major fighter acquisition has taken place. A 2018 proposal to procure 114 medium fighters remains in limbo—no trials, no movement. Meanwhile, China is pushing ahead at breakneck speed. In December 2024, it unveiled two sixth-generation stealth jet prototypes. In contrast, India’s indigenous fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) won’t be operational until 2035. This technological lag is compounded by Pakistan’s growing reliance on Chinese military support—with over 80% of its defense imports now sourced from China. Singh warns that within 5–6 years, Pakistan could field stealth fighters while India scrambles to catch up.

But the crisis runs deeper than just jets. Singh described a “desperate” shortfall in critical force multipliers—AWACS (airborne early warning systems), refueling tankers, electronic warfare platforms, drones, and surveillance assets. These are the tools that give an air force reach, flexibility, and superiority. Yet today, Pakistan fields more AWACS and refuelers than India—despite its smaller size and budget. Singh emphasized that having enough refuelers dramatically increases how far fighter jets can operate, enabling strategic depth and resilience.

Human capital is also under strain. Between 2015 and 2021, the IAF’s pilot shortage widened from 486 to nearly 600, and recruitment continues to fall short each year. While the shortage may not feel acute today—due to the lack of aircraft—it will become critical if and when the fleet begins to expand.

Aircraft serviceability is another serious concern. Only 50–55% of IAF jets are flight-ready at any given time, based on figures shared by retired officers.

The introduction of the Agnipath recruitment scheme in 2022 has further complicated the situation. The scheme allows for just four years of service for most recruits, with 75% exiting thereafter. For an organization like the IAF—where training is highly technical and time-intensive—this short cycle may prove harmful. Singh highlighted the strong resistance the scheme faced within the Air Force, including from retired chiefs and even General Naravane, who disclosed in unpublished memoirs that the IAF was firmly opposed. The concern: in five to ten years, India could find itself with undertrained personnel, unable to manage complex combat systems.

The IAF’s resistance to the proposed unified theater commands also speaks to deeper structural tensions. Given its ability to rapidly reposition assets across the country, the IAF sees India as a single operational theater. With only 31 squadrons, dividing resources across multiple commands would weaken flexibility. As a result, theater command reforms remain stalled, with the Air Force advocating for centralized control.

All this is unfolding against the backdrop of a shrinking defense budget. Defense spending as a share of GDP is at a historic low—even lower than it was in 1962, before the war with China. Over 52% of the budget goes to salaries and pensions, leaving little room for capital investments. Expensive assets like fighter jets are becoming harder to afford. A promising deal with the U.S. for F414 jet engines—hailed during PM Modi’s 2023 visit—now hangs in the balance, as protectionist policies under a returning Trump administration threaten to stall cooperation.

That the Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh has publicly voiced concern—twice in recent months—only underscores how critical the situation has become. A classified report prepared by a committee under the Defence Secretary reportedly outlines the severity but remains withheld from public view. Singh’s message was clear: without immediate action—increased funding, accelerated procurement, and systemic reform—the IAF could find itself unable to fulfill its core mission in the event of a major conflict.

"When the balloon goes up," Singh warned, "the Indian Air Force may not be in a position to perform." A chilling forecast of a possible catastrophe within the next five to six years.

Despite having been in power for over a decade, the Modi government has yet to present a credible roadmap to resolve this crisis. The numbers are damning. The progress is negligible. Singh was unequivocal: "You cannot keep blaming your predecessors after eleven years in power." The window to act is narrowing. The time for action is now.

Source :- @AFI